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In addition to its status as the world's largest jailer, the United States is an extreme outlier in its juvenile justice and sentencing practices. As recently as 2005, the United States permitted juvenile execution, and today the United States is the only nation that allows children to be sentenced to life without parole. In the last fifteen years, in a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy, the Supreme Court had been slowly chipping away at the nation's use of the most extreme juvenile sentences-the death penalty and life without parole. That process came to an abrupt end this past term with the Court's decision in Jones v. Mississippi. While not a surprise, the Jones decision was a blow to the juvenile justice community and certainly to Brett Jones himself. Youth advocates have decried the Jones decision as "barbaric," "abhorrent," and "ludicrous," but, as I argue in this Essay, ultimately Jones is a loss for the Court and its institutional reputation-perhaps more so than the juvenile justice community. In the last two decades, juvenile advocates have been very successful at educating the public about juveniles' diminished culpability and enhanced capacity for rehabilitation-and at translating that education into policy changes at the state level. There is reason to hope such changes will continue notwithstanding the disappointing realities of Jones. This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly describes the Miller trilogy, the question presented in Jones, and the holding in Jones-at least as the majority presents it. Part II analyzes the Jones decision, identifying the ways in which it is an enormous break from precedent, woefully out of touch with the realities of criminal justice, and cruel in its language of indifference. Part III turns to the question of how juvenile advocates might proceed in the aftermath of Jones, mapping out a path for sustained reform in legislative, judicial, and executive bodies. By way of conclusion, I examine an avenue for challenging extreme juvenile sentences that ...

In a series of Eighth Amendment cases referred to as the Miller trilogy, the Supreme Court significantly limited the extent to which minors may be exposed to extreme sentences. Specifically, in this line of cases the Court abolished capital punishment for minors and narrowed the instances when minors may be sentenced to life without parole. Only minors convicted of homicide who are found to be "in-corrigible" may now be subject to a death-in-custody sentence. In limiting extreme sentences for youth in these ways, the Supreme Court relied upon the social and medical science that demonstrates youth are simultaneously less culpable for their acts and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults. While the Miller trilogy has set in motion many significant juvenile justice reforms, youth in America are still exposed to extreme sentences—sentences that are disproportionate given the nature of the juvenile brain. Two mechanisms operate to maintain this status quo. First, automatic transfer provisions allow children to be charged, tried, and convicted in criminal court as if they were adults. This legal fiction flies in the face of the science on which the Miller trilogy was predicated. Second, once in adult court, youth are subject to mandatory sentencing schemes that were drafted with adults in mind. Again, this automatic sentencing without regard for the mitigating qualities of youth ignores the logic of the Miller trilogy. Indeed, some courts have recognized the disconnect between the Supreme Court's declaration that "kids are different" for sentencing purposes and the ongoing use of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes for youth. For the most part, though, courts view correction of these laws as purely a legislative prerogative. In this Article, I argue that, in fact, there is a clear path for courts to find both automatic transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth unlawful after Miller. This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the Miller ...

This Article examines the Supreme Court's landmark In re Gault decision of 1967, in which the Supreme Court ushered in the "due process era" of juvenile justice in America by determining that juveniles were entitled to the right to counsel and other procedural safeguards during delinquency proceedings. But this Article continues with a critical focus on the impact of the decision today, examining a dichotomy between what was declared a "revolution in children's rights," and how youth in the criminal justice system still have not seen the extent of constitutional protections declared necessary by Gault. Arguing that Gault has never been fully implemented, the Article offers two explanations for its stunted application, stating neither of which was within the Gault Court's control. Finally, it considers more recent juvenile sentencing decisions in light of the post-Gault era, outlining the conclusion that comprehensive, lasting juvenile justice reform must be sought in state legislatures.

In 2003, when Terrence Graham was sixteen, he and three other teens attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. Though they left with no money, and no one was seriously injured, Terrence was sentenced to die in prison for his involvement in that crime. As shocking as Terrence's sentence sounds, it is merely a symptom of contemporary American juvenile justice practices. In the United States, adolescents are routinely transferred out of juvenile court and into adult criminal court without any judicial oversight. Once in adult court, children can be sentenced without regard for their youth. Juveniles are housed in adult correctional facilities, they may be held in solitary confinement, and they experience the highest rates of sexual and physical assault among inmates. Until 2005, children convicted in America's courts were subject to the death penalty; today, they still may be sentenced to die in prison-no matter what efforts they make to rehabilitate themselves. America has waged a war on kids. In The War on Kids, Cara Drinan reveals how the United States went from being a pioneer to an international pariah in its juvenile sentencing practices. Academics and journalists have long recognized the failings of juvenile justice practices in this country and have called for change. Despite the uncertain political climate, there is hope that recent Supreme Court decisions may finally make those calls a reality. The War on Kids seizes upon this moment of judicial and political recognition that children are different in the eyes of the law. Drinan chronicles the shortcomings of juvenile justice by drawing upon social science, legal decisions, and first-hand correspondence with Terrence and others like him-individuals whose adolescent errors have cost them their lives. At the same time, The War on Kids maps out concrete steps that states can take to correct the course of American juvenile justice. ; https://scholarship.law.edu/fac_books/1124/thumbnail.jpg

In a series of cases culminating in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court has limited the extent to which juveniles may be exposed to the harshest criminal sentences. Scholars have addressed discrete components of these recent Court decisions, from their Eighth Amendment methodology to their effect upon state legislation. In this Article, I draw upon that scholarship to make a broader claim: the Miller trilogy has revolutionized juvenile justice. While we have begun to see only the most inchoate signs of this revolution in practice, this Article endeavors to describe what this revolution may look like both in the immediate term and in years to come. Part I demonstrates how the United States went from being the leader in progressive juvenile justice to being an international outlier in the severity of its juvenile sentencing. Part II examines the Miller decision, as well as its immediate predecessor cases, and explains why Miller demands a capacious reading. Part III explores the post-Miller revolution in juvenile justice that is afoot. Specifically, Part III makes the case for two immediate corollaries that flow from Miller, each of which is groundbreaking in its own right: 1) the creation of procedural safeguards for juveniles facing life without parole ("LWOP") comparable to those recommended for adults facing the death penalty; and 2) the elimination of mandatory minimums for juveniles altogether. Finally, Part III identifies ways in which juvenile justice advocates can leverage the moral leadership of the Miller Court to seek future reform in three key areas: juvenile transfer laws; presumptive sentencing guidelines as they apply to children; and juvenile conditions of confinement.

As we mark the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, in this Article I argue that we can and should be more realistic in our efforts to enforce the right to counsel. Assuming, as many now do, that five decades of resource-starved indigent defense will likely continue in the future, where are our efforts most effectively deployed in the years to come? I address that question in three parts. Part II briefly acknowledges the entrenched crisis in indigent defense that is as old as the Gideon decision itself. Part III examines the most salient reform efforts of the last fifty years, highlighting those that have made a lasting impact on the provision of indigent defense services. Part IV suggests that some efforts of the last five decades need to be de-emphasized to make room for efforts that are achievable and imperative in the near term. In particular, I suggest that defenders need to seize upon this political and economic climate and pursue diversion and decriminalization; that systemic litigation should be rare and only a measure of last resort; and that the defense community needs to explore the role that nonlawyers can play in protecting the rights of criminal defendants.

In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to sentence a non-homicide juvenile offender to life in prison without parole. While states need not guarantee release to these juvenile offenders, they cannot foreclose such an outcome at the sentencing phase. Scholars have identified several long-term ramifications of Graham, including its likely influence on juvenile sentencing practices and on retributive justice theory. As yet unexamined, though, are the important and thorny legal questions that Graham raises for state judges and lawmakers in the very short term. To whom does the Graham decision apply? What is the appropriate remedy for those inmates? What affirmative obligations does the Graham decision impose upon the states? This Article endeavors to answer these and other pressing questions that confront judges and legislators today. Part I briefly describes the Graham opinion and surveys what scholars to date have identified as salient aspects of the decision. Part II seeks to provide a blueprint for lower courts and legislatures implementing the Graham decision. Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is retroactively applicable to all inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile non-homicide crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under Graham require effective representation at their resentencing hearings; (3) judges presiding over resentencing hearings should err in favor of rehabilitation over retribution to comport with the spirit of Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and executive action are necessary in order to make Graham's promise a reality. Finally, Part III situates Graham in the context of our nation's ongoing criminal justice failings. While the sentence challenged in Graham ought to be viewed as a symptom of such failings, the Graham decision may offer a window of hope for reform on that same front.

In Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to the plea negotiation process and held that prejudicial error can flow from ineffective plea advice. The defense community has applauded these decisions for recognizing the pivotal role that guilty pleas play in our criminal justice system and for requiring a minimum level of efficacy in plea lawyering. In this brief essay, I suggest that Frye and Lafler are victories for the defense community in yet another way. The decisions reflect judicial realism, and in this respect, they are especially important cases for systemic public defense litigation. Courts confronted with these suits in the past have stymied reform efforts by approaching these suits in a formalistic way, sending plaintiffs either to seek a post-conviction remedy or legislative redress, neither of which are practical options. Frye and Lafler, because they are grounded in the reality of today's criminal justice system, may provide critical leverage to lawyers asking courts for systemic relief.